Immigration and Naturalization by Klein, David A.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 20 | Issue 3 Article 5
1-1969
Immigration and Naturalization
David A. Klein
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
David A. Klein, Immigration and Naturalization, 20 Hastings L.J. 1039 (1969).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol20/iss3/5
VI. Immigration and Naturalization
A. Judicial Review of Deportation Proceedings-Kasravi v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 400 F.2d 675
(9th Cir. 1968); Asghari v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 396 F.2d 391
(9th Cir. 1968).
In the field of immigration law, two sections of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 19521 have caused unique difficulties for the
courts in developing a workable judicial review of actions taken by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service.2  Sections 243 (h) and
244 of the Act grant to the Attorney General discretionary authority
to withhold or suspend deportation of aliens under certain specified
circumstances. 3 The difficulties arise because these sections deal with
two areas of administrative action into which the courts generally in-
trude only with hesitation. Immigration has always been regarded
as having a large quantum of political overtones, 4 and discretionary
1 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(Supp. I, 1965), amending 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1964) [hereinafter cited as "Act
of 1952"]; Act of 1952, § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1964).
2 The Immigration and Naturalization Service hereinafter is referred to
as "Service" in the text.
3 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(f), 79 Stat. 918, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (Supp. I, 1965), amending Act of 1952, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 214, 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1964), provides: "The Attorney General is authorized to
withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in
which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of
race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems
to be necessary for such reason."
Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247, amending
Act of 1952, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1964), provides in part:
"[T]he Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and ad-
just the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension
of deportation and ... is deportable under any law of the United States...
[and] has been physically present in the United States for a continuous
period of not less than seven years... and proves that.., he was and is a
person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in
the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or
to his spouse ......
4 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952); Carlson
v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 705 (1893); Edu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Mackay v.
Turner, 283 F.2d 728 (9th Cir.), stay denied sub nom., Niukkanen v. Turner,
364 U.S. 888 (1960).
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action has always been subject to a very limited review by the
courts.5 Two cases recently decided by the Ninth Circuit illustrate
some aspects of these difficulties and the attitudes of the courts to-
ward their resolution.
In Asghari v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,6 and
Kasravi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,7 the Ninth Cir-
cuit had before it the petitions of two Iranian students seeking a re-
view of the Service's refusal to grant discretionary relief under Sec-
tion 243 (h).8 The petitioners had expressed vociferous criticism of
the Shah of Iran throughout the time they were students in the
United States and had participated in demonstrations against the
Shah during his visits to this country in 1963 and 1965. Petitioners
conceded deportability in each case,9 but claimed that their views
and activities had become known to the Shah and other Iranian of-
ficials, and that if deported to Iran they would be subjected to perse-
cution because of their activities. Kasravi, in addition, applied for
relief under section 244 (a) on the ground that he would suffer extreme
hardship should he be deported.10 The application in each case was
denied by the special inquiry officer presiding at the hearing. Each
decision was affirmed on appeal by the Board of Immigration
Appeals."
The aliens contended that denial of their applications was an
abuse of discretion by the Service and that they had not been afforded
a fair hearing or due process of law.1 2 Kasravi also claimed that the
inquiry officer's decision was in error as it was against the weight of
the evidence.'3s
During the course of each hearing the Service introduced into
evidence a letter received from the State Department in answer to
inquiries made by the Service on the likelihood of persecution in Iran.
The letter, addressed to the District Commissioner of Immigration,
5 4 K. DAViS, Ani\izsTIATwVE LAW TREATISE § 28.08, at 33, 41 (1958).
6 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968) [Immigration and Naturalization Service
hereinafter is cited as "INS" in case citations].
7 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
s U.S.C. § 1253 (h) (Supp. I, 1965).
9 Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 1968); Asghari v. INS,
396 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 1968).
10 Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 1968), construing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a) (inability to find work in Iranian film industry not extreme hard-
ship under the Act).
11 For regulations on administrative appeal procedure, see 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.20-.22 (1968).
12 The leading case for the proposition that resident aliens are en-
titled to procedural due process is The Japanese Immigrant Case. Yamataya
v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903). See also text accompanying note 21 infra.
's Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1968).
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reported that "'[o]pposition to the regime per se does not subject
an individual to persecution whether the opposition occurred in Iran or
here.' "14 The admission of this letter into evidence was objected to
by counsel for the petitioners, primarily on the grounds that the
aliens were denied the opportunity of cross-examination and also that
the inquiry officer had no basis in law for relying on such evidence
because no foundation had been laid for the author's expertise or
experience.15
In two opinions the Ninth Circuit upheld the decisions of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, finding neither abuse of discretion
nor denial of a fair hearing and procedural due process of law.
Analysis of the Courtes Decisions in the Light of Existing Law
The Ninth Circuit, as well as the other federal courts, has taken
a very restrictive view of its scope of review under sections 243 (h)
and 244.16 In order to understand the reasons for this position, it is
necessary to look briefly at the characteristics of immigration law
which made it somewhat unique with respect to judicial review.
Immigration did not take on substantial importance for the courts
until after the Civil War, when the great tide of new immigrants from
Southern Europe and the Orient reached its peak. Congress, in re-
sponse to domestic reaction to this new wave of aliens, for the first
time passed laws designed to restrict the entrance of foreigners into
the United States. These restrictions were upheld as a valid exercise
of the power inherent in the concept of sovereignty as defined by
international law, rather than on the basis of any provisions in the
Constitution.17 Congress, as the arm of the sovereign in which this
power resides, could deny entrance to aliens entirely, or admit them
upon such conditions as it saw fit to prescribe.18
When early immigration statutes were attacked because violative
of due process, the Supreme Court took refuge behind the above
definition of congressional power:
[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations,
14 Asghari v. INS, 396 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 1968).
15 Record at 56, Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968); Brief for
Appellant at 67, Asghari v. INS, 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968).
16 Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1968); Asghari v. INS,
396 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 1968). For cases in other jurisdictions, see, e.g.,
Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715 (2d
Cir. 1966); Milutin v. Bouchard, 299 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1962).
17 Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). In Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893), the Supreme Court declared that the
power to expel aliens rested on the same ground.
18 Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892).
1041March 1969]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of govern-
ment. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political
branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry
or interference. 19
The Court has realized that absolute power resting unchecked in one
branch of the government is repugnant to the concept of checks and
balances and has retreated to some extent from this position. Never-
theless, this statement constitutes the basic premise from which the
courts proceed when reviewing actions by the Service.
20
Until 1903, the legal community generally believed that aliens
were not protected by the Constitution. However, in The Japanese
Immigrant Case,21 decided in that year, the Supreme Court held that
resident aliens were entitled to procedural due process and that ex-
pulsion proceedings had to include adequate provision for a fair hear-
ing.22 Yet in the area of substantive rights the courts have continued
to hold that "[d]ue process does not invest any alien with a right
to enter the United States, nor . .. the right to remain against the
national will. ' 23 The alien remains by sufferance, and his continued
stay "is a matter of permission and tolerance,"24 subject to the require-
ments of due process. As a result, the courts have restricted their
activities in the area of deportation to seeing that administrative
determinations of an alien's deportability are made fairly.25 Judicial
review does not extend to questioning the propriety of the criteria
established by Congress for arriving at these determinations, 2 par-
19 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). See also
Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
20 See, e.g., Millan-Garcia v. INS, 343 F.2d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 1965); Yian-
nopoulos v. Robinson, 247 F.2d 655, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1957); United States v.
Kershner, 228 F.2d 142, 145 (6th Cir. 1955); cf. Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115
(1957); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952).
21 Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
22 Id. at 100-01.
23 Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218, 222-23 (1953) (dissenting
opinion). The majority opinion in Mezei, supra at 216, is in agreement with
Mr. Justice Jackson on this point. But see Hesse, The Constitutional Status of
the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the
Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262 (1959) (analysis of all Supreme Court deci-
sions on point); Note, Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality,
66 HARv. L. REv. 205 (1953).
For a discussion of the distinctions between substantive and procedural
due process see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Shaughnessy
v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218-28 (1953).
24 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952); accord, Gal-
van v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
25 Otten v. INS, 367 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 916
(1967); McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1959); De Souza v. Barber,
263 F.2d 470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989 (1959).
26 It should be kept in mind, however, that the authority of the execu-
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ticularly when Congress has given the Service discretionary powers
in deportation matters.
The basic problem, then, is that the courts must resolve the in-
herent conflict between the two basic principles involved in immi-
gration-"political control over the borders, and constitutional due
process-each of which, if taken separately, would lead to opposite
conclusions." 2  The courts' function is to balance these two "basic
issues."
In Asghari,28 the Ninth Circuit took the position that in section
243 (h) cases "[t]he sole issue is whether the petitioner was afforded
a fair hearing and due process of his application for discretionary
relief."29 This is in accord with decisions of the Board of Immigration
Appeals' holding that a decision denying relief under section 243(h)
need not be based upon a specific finding of ineligibility for relief;
rather, it can be treated as a pure exercise of discretion.3 0
Further limiting the scope of review, the courts generally have
not required the Service to conform strictly to the rules of evidence
prevailing in judicial proceedings.31 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit
tive branch (here the Service) to implement the immigration law is defined
by Congress. The courts can always review administrative action to see that
the administrative agency stays within the confines of its statutory authority.
Yet this review is frustrated, in part, because Congress has given the Service
wide flexibility of decision, particularly in discretionary matters. The courts
have upheld this allocation of responsibility so long as the statute provides
some standards for executive action. See, e.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
27 Note, Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue between
Congress and the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760, 782 (1962).
28 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968).
29 Id. at 392.
30 In re Liao, 11 I. & N. Dec. 113, 119 (Board of Immigration Appeals,
1968). This would seem to be the better view from a logical standpoint al-
though some courts apparently hold otherwise. The cases have concerned the
Service's construction of the term "persecution" and should be characterized as
decisions which reviewed the actual exercise of discretion by the Service.
See, e.g., Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963); Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton,
297 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1962); Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1961).
See text following note 42 infra.
It is illogical to hold that section 243(h) first requires a determination of
eligibility for relief on the basis of a finding by the special inquiry officer
that the alien will be persecuted, and then authorizes the Attorney General,
once eligibility is established, to withhold deportation, if in his opinion, the
alien will be persecuted if deported. Unlike section 244, section 243(h) has no
language of preliminary requirements which the alien must meet before he
can be considered for relief. The entire process should be treated as an exer-
cise of discretion and reviewed by the courts on that basis.
31 See Tisi v. Todd, 264 U.S. 131, 134 (1924); Morgano v. Pilliod, 299 F.2d
217, 219 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 924 (1962); Bufalino v. Holland, 277
F.2d 270, 275 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960).
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in Kasravi 2 and Asghari33 held that the State Department letter was
admissible evidence, on the authority of its earlier decision in Nam-
kung v. Boyd.34 Namkung held that because the withholding of de-
portation in section 243(h) cases is entirely within the judgment and
opinion of the Attorney General:
[I]t was proper for the hearing officer to forward the Consul Gen-
General's letter35 to the Assistant Commissioner [of Immigration]
promptly upon its receipt by him, and it was proper for the Assistant
Commissioner to consider it in arriving at his conclusion that there
was no basis for the alien's fears.8 6
Certainly the best source of information on whether a Korean national
would be persecuted in Korea is not the Korean Consul General. 7
The court's acquiescence in the use of such "evidence" is an implicit
recognition of the political nature of immigration in general and of
discretionary relief under section 243 (h) in particular.
The Ninth Circuit squarely faced the problems involved in the
use of letters from the State Department in Kasravi:38
The only evidence offered in opposition [by the government] ... is
rather a perfunctory letter written by a State Department official
concluding generally that an Iranian student would not in all likeli-
hood be persecuted for activities in the United States. Not only does
this letter lack persuasiveness, but the competency of State Depart-
ment letters in matters of this kind are highly questionable.3 9
In a footnote, however, the court justifies the use of such evidence:
Such letters from the State Department do not carry the guarantees
of reliability which the law demands of admissible evidence. A frank,
but official, discussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly
nation is not always compatible with the high duty to maintain advan-
tageous diplomatic relations with nations throughout the world. The
traditional foundation required of expert testimony is lacking; nor
can official position be said to supply an acceptable substitute. No
hearing officer or court has the means to know the diplomatic neces-
sities of the moment, in the light of which the statements must be
82 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
83 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968).
34 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955).
35 In Namkung v. Boyd the Service had denied the application of a South
Korean for discretionary relief partially on the basis of a letter solicited from
the Korean Consul General. The letter said that the alien had no grounds for
fearing persecution if he returned to South Korea.
36 226 F.2d at 389.
87 In Sang Ryup Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1952), a
similar letter had been solicited from the Korean Ambassador to the United
States. The court, commenting on the validity of this letter as evidence upon
which to base a denial of relief, said, "[n] or should a statement, solicited...
from the diplomatic representative of such nation, that the alien would not
be persecuted there, suffice. No other reply could reasonably be expected."
Id. at 607 (emphasis by the court).
88 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
39 Id. at 676-77.
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The court agreed with the Second Circuit that: "[T]he very na-
ture of the decision [the Service] must make concerning what the
foreign country is likely to do is a political issue into which the
courts should not intrude."41 The net result of the court's holding
is that almost any information may be considered by the special in-
quiry officer so long as it has some probative value and its use does
not contradict essential notions of fairness.
In a related matter the court in Kasravi dismissed the contention
that the decision of the inquiry officer was against the weight of the
evidence. 42 The court flatly rejected the assertion that the inquiry
officer further erred in finding Kasravi ineligible for discretionary
relief. The finding that Kasravi was not "statutorily eligible" for
relief was not a finding of fact based upon an evaluation of the rec-
ord before the officer. 43 The court noted that if such a finding were
required by section 243(h) it would be subject to the reasonable,
substantial and probative evidence test required by section 106 (a) (4)
of the Immigration Act.44 Instead, "Congress [had] made it abun-
dantly clear by the express wording of the statute45 that no such
finding was contemplated or required."46  It concluded: "[Con-
gress] left to the broad discretion of the Attorney General the au-
thority to suspend deportation in such cases and the questions of
both eligibility and merit (if there be a difference) are part and parcel
of this administrative determination." 47
The weight of authority supports the holding that consideration
of applications under section 243(h) is purely discretionary, involving
no preliminary findings of eligibility.48 Only the Second Circuit has
taken a different position.
40 Id. at 677 n.1.
41 Id. at 677-78, quoting United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy,
206 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1953).
42 400 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 1968).
43 Id. at 677.
44 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(4) (1964). This section of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 requires that a finding of deportability be based upon
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the record, and that such a
finding be conclusive if so based.
45 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. I, 1965). The court, Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d
675, 677 (9th Cir. 1968), quotes the text of this section and italicizes the words
"in his opinion" and "as he deems to be necessary." Section 1254 also uses
the words "in his opinion." See note 3 supra for the full text of these sections.
46 Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1968).
47 Id. at 477-78.
48 See, e.g., Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1961);
Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950
(1961); Chao-Ling Wang v. Pilliod, 285 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1960); United
States ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton, 248 F.2d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
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In Sovich v. Esperdy49 the Second Circuit, after reviewing cases
granting relief to deportable aliens because of administrative mis-
construction of discretionary power, conceded that in some cases ad-
ministrative expertise might require courts to defer to administrative
judgment. However, the court maintained that no such problem of
administrative expertise existed in the case before it. "We hold
that the courts may review the Attorney General's construction of
the statutory limits within which his discretion is to operate under
Section 243(h)."" ° It went on to find that the Service misconstrued
the limits of its discretion in ruling that imprisonment for illegal
departure from a country was never "physical persecution" under
section 243(h). The case was remanded to the Service for a new deter-
mination of the alien's application.51
Judge Moore, registering a strong dissent, argued:
I believe that the Attorney General alone has the competence to give
content to [the] phrase [physical persecution]. Only that branch of
government to which is entrusted the safeguard of our foreign rela-
tions, and has the attendant facilities, information and experience can
meaningfully gauge all the subtleties and variations of action that are
designed to . . . persecute. The realities of a world in which more
than half of its population live in varying degrees of political slavery
... require that the meaning of [persecution] be constantly recast
and re-evaluated .... 52
Judge Moore reaches the same conclusion5 3 as the Ninth Circuit,
which said in Kasravi: "The scope of our review does not permit
this court to substitute its opinion for that of the Attorney General."54
Analysis of the wording of the statute supports this view.
The Attorney General is "authorized", not required, to withhold
deportation if "in his opinion" the alien will suffer persecution when
deported. Even if the Attorney General opines that the alien will
be persecuted, he is not required to withhold deportation.55  This
interpretation has been upheld by the Supreme Court in cases under
section 244, which has similar language. 6
[T]he statute does not contemplate that all aliens who meet the mini-
356 U.S. 932 (1958); Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1955).
Contra, Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963). But see Zupich v. Es-
perdy, 207 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), af'd, 319 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 993 (1964) (review of decision of the Attorney General
on question of persecution limited to finding of arbitrariness or capriciousness).
49 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963).
50 Id. at 27.
51 Id. at 29.
52 Id. at 30, 34-35 (dissenting opinion).
53 Id.
54 Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1968).
55 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (h) (Supp. I, 1965).
55 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1964). See, e.g., Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353
U.S. 72 (1957).
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mum legal standards will be granted suspension [from deportation].
Suspension of deportation is a matter of discretion and of administra-
tive grace, not mere eligibility; discretion must be exercised even
though statutory requirements have been met.57
The Second Circuit case of Sovich58 could lead the courts into
the thicket of political and foreign policy judgments, a course which
the judiciary, recognizing its lack of experience in such matters, has
avoided whenever possible.59 The arguments in the majority and
dissenting opinions in Sovich illustrate the difficulties encountered
by the courts in developing an effectual review over this type of case.
Undeniably, some scrutiny of the Service's construction of the stat-
utory standards of section 243(h) is desirable. No administrative
agency can be the final arbiter of its own legal authority without
seriously jeopardizing the constitutional ideal of limited and counter-
vailing power in each branch of government. In the final analysis,
the court's definition of the extent of judicial review is a policy de-
cision to be made with full realization of the political nature of the
statute.
Judicial Review of Abuse of Discretion
The weight of authority in the federal courts supports the Ninth
Circuit's position that judicial review of a discretionary denial of re-
lief from deportation is limited to a determination of whether or not
"the decision is without a rational basis and is arbitrary, capricious
or an abuse of discretion."60  "Abuse of discretion" has been given
various meanings by the courts, which can be summarized by two
basic definitions. One version, as defined by Judge Magruder, is that:
[W]hen judicial action is taken in a discretionary matter, such action
cannot be set aside by a reviewing court unless it has a definite and
firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judg-
ment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant
factors.61
Believing that a more limited definition is appropriate when a
court is reviewing discretionary action taken by an administrative
agency, the Second Circuit has defined "abuse of discretion" in de-
portation cases as decisions:
57 Id. at 77.
58 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963).
59 See, e.g., Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968); Blazina v.
Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); United
States ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton, 248 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 932 (1958); Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955); United
States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
60 E.g., Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963); accord, Wong Wing Hang v. INS,
360 F.2d 715, 717-18 (2d Cir. 1966); Schieber v. INS, 347 F.2d 353, 354 (9th
Cir. 1965); Obrenovic v. Pilliod, 282 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1960).
61 In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954).
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[M]ade without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from
established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as an
invidious discrimination against a particular race or group .... 62
Other courts, including the Ninth Circuit, consider the above
criteria to be independent grounds for reversal of a decision by the
Service, rather than attributes of "abuse of discretion" itself.6 3 In
fact, the conflict is a matter of semantics because the application of
either standard leads to the same result.
In most cases where courts have reversed the Service, they have
held that the Service's actions constituted an arbitrary refusal to
exercise discretion at all. For example, the Attorney General may
have established categories of aliens who are to be excluded, per se,
from any consideration for discretionary relief.6 4 By law, each
alien should have a right to a consideration of his application on its
merits; nevertheless, the Attorney General may formulate general
policies in keeping with his responsibilities of assuring effective en-
forcement of the immigration laws.65 These policies are valid if they
leave sufficient room to judge each case on its own facts.66 When a
decision of the Service is reversed, the court usually remands the case
with instructions to reconsider the application on its merits. 67
Where the record shows that discretion has been exercised, the
courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment on an alien's qualifi-
cations for relief for the Service's, even if they disagree with the
decision.68 Furthermore, the mental processes of an administrative
officer, like those of a judge, cannot be questioned.69  Because the
courts have so narrowly defined the standards of review, the alien faces
an uphill battle if he is ever to secure relief from deportation. Not
only must he persuade the Service that it should exercise its discretion,
and do so favorably; but if he fails, he must convince the court that
the decision was grossly arbitrary or without a rational basis. In view
of the obstacles confronting the alien, the statement in one treatise
that efforts to review decisions made pursuant to sections 243(h) and
244 ,generally have encountered an unfavorable judicial climate70
would appear to be a classic understatement.
62 Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966).
68 See, e.g., Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1968).
64 See, e.g., Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir.
1950).
65 See, e.g., Lo Duca v. Neely, 213 F.2d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1954).
66 Cf. United States ex rel. James v. Shaughnessy, 202 F.2d 519, 521 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 969 (1953).
67 See, e.g., Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1966).
68 Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 279 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
860 (1961).
69 Weiss v. Esperdy, 27 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
70 2 C. GoRDoN & H. RosENm=, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 8.14,
at 8-93 (1967).
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Ancillary Problems of Review Under Section 244
Discretionary action taken under section 244, unlike that under
section 243(h), has two phases. The first phase involves a deter-
mination of the alien's eligibility for relief under the standards pre-
scribed by the statute. The second phase involves the actual exercise
of discretion and is subject to the same standards of review as are sec-
tion 243 (h) applications. 71
The determination of eligibility takes place during the deporta-
tion hearing.72 According to the holding in Kasravi, this finding,
unlike a finding of deportability, need not be supported by reason-
able, substantial and probative evidence.7 3
Since the determination of eligibility involves questions of law
and fact, there should be a somewhat broader area of review for the
courts. Although the courts have not said explicitly what rule of
evidence is applied to findings of eligibility, it appears from an exam-
ination of the cases and texts that the courts apply some variant of
the scintilla rule.74 Charles Gordon and Harry Rosenfield, authorities
in the field of immigration, conclude that "[s]uch factual determi-
nations are subject only to limited judicial review, apparently on a
showing of arbitrariness. '7 5 Because the courts are reluctant to be-
come involved in immigration cases, they apply the same limited
standards of review to findings of eligibility for discretionary relief
as they do to the exercise of discretion by the Service in denying that
relief.
The weight of authority is definitely in favor of this limited notion
of review, but a recent dictum by the Supreme Court has implicitly
questioned its permanency.
Since a special inquiry officer cannot exercise his discretion to sus-
pend deportation until he finds the alien statutorily eligible for sus-
pension, a finding of eligibility and exercise of (or refusal to exer-
71 See text accompanying notes 60-70 supra.
72 For the procedures prescribed for deportation hearings and applica-
tions for discretionary relief, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 242, 243.4, 244 (1968), with par-
ticular reference to sections 242.8-.17.
73 See, e.g., Batistic v. Pilliod, 286 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1960) (by implica-
tion); Chao-Ling Wang v. Pifliod, 285 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1960); cf. Jay v. Boyd,
351 U.S. 345 (1956). But see Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963) where the Su-
preme Court did not preclude the possibility of applying the substantial-
evidence rule to section 244 cases.
74 For a definition of the scintilla rule, see S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 375 (1946). If the findings are "sustained by a scintilla of evidence,
no matter how lacking in probative force, the court must sustain it." This
definition is also reported in 4 K. DAVIS, ADnvA=sTsAT LAw TREATIsE § 29.06,
at 147 (1958).
75 2 C. GoRDoN & H. ROSENFIELD, IM=IGRATION LAw AND PROcEDURE § 8.14,
at 8-95 (1967).
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cise) discretion may properly be considered as distinct and separate
matters. And since the finding of eligibility involves questions of
fact and law, [Section 106 (a) (4) of the Act 76] might be read to re-
quire that this finding be based on substantial evidence in the record. 77
It is likely that the Supreme Court will eventually impose this re-
quirement because of its feeling that deportation, while not a crim-
inal action, is a drastic measure, akin to banishment.78
Errors of Law
The scope of review for errors of law under section 244 has been
much broader than that for errors of fact. The courts proceed on the
assumption that they are at least as competent as the Service to
interpret the statutory language concerning eligibity.79 In McG'rath
v. Kristensen,8 0 the Supreme Court affirmed a- court of appeals re-
versal of a Service ruling that an alien was ineligible for citizenship
because he had sought exemption from military service during World
War II on the basis of a United States treaty with his native country.
By the terms of the statute any alien ineligible for citizenship is ex-
cluded automatically from consideration for discretionary relief.8 '
Similarly, the Court has reversed a denial of relief because the Attor-
ney General had erroneously construed section 244 as precluding re-
lief to an alien who had violated certain minor requirements of alien
registration.82 Finally, the courts will intervene if it appears that the
76 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1964).
77 Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 228 n.15 (1963). See also Wong Wing Hang
v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) (dictum).
The substantial-evidence rule does not affect the burden of proof. The
Supreme Court made this clear in the case of Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276
(1966). The decision in that case held that the substantial-evidence rule
(8 U.S.C. §§ 1105a(4), 1252(b)(4) (1964) ) was not addressed to the degree of
proof required at the administrative level in the deportation proceedings, but
to quite a different subject-the scope of judicial review. Insofar as the rule
represents a yardstick for the administrative factfinder, it goes "to the quality
and nature of the evidence upon which a deportation order must be based."
Woodby v. INS, supra at 283. Lattig v. Pilliod, 289 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1961,
has defined the scope of review under the substantial-evidence rule: 'Deter-
mination of whether there is substantial evidence does not require that the
evidence be weighed, but only that there be reasonable support in the evidence
to induce the conviction that the finding was proper .... " Id. at 480. See
also Woodby v. INS, supra at 284, for a more extensive discussion of the rule.
78 INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966) (by implication); Rosenberg v.
Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (1954).
79 E.g., McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950); Sovich v. Esperdy,
319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963); Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1962); Chi
Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1961); McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.
2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960); Pagano v. Brownell, 227 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
80 340 U.S. 162 (1950).
81 Id. at 163 n.1.
82 Desallernos v. Savoretti, 356 U.S. 269 (1958).
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alien was not given a fair hearing for the determination of his eligi-
gibility.88
Because the courts have a very limited area of review over the
actual exercise of discretion, and because applications for discre-
tionary relief under section 244 are only infrequently granted, judg-
ing from the number of petitions to the courts of appeals, the courts
have a duty to ensure that the alien obtains fair consideration of his
application on the merits of his case. Although the courts have inter-
vened in the past when they have found errors of law or a clear
denial of due process, this has not been the case with errors of fact.
The scintilla rule of evidence does not provide an effective re-
view of factual determinations because the Service's decision must
be upheld if there is any evidence to support it. One of the more
blatant examples of the ineffectiveness of the scintilla rule can be
be found in Kasravi. Admitting that the alien's "position [was]
strongly supported by two expert witnesses, each of whom [had]
impressive qualifications . . . . 84 the Ninth Circuit, nevertheless,
upheld the Service on the basis of the State Department letter, evi-
dence which the court itself termed unpersuasive.8 5 Decisions like
this are no more than judicial rubber-stampings of Service decisions.
The substantial-evidence rule would enable the courts to scrutinize
more carefully the quality of the evidence and would be more in
keeping with the vital importance of discretionary relief from depor-
tation to the alien.
Conclusion
The two cases decided by the Ninth Circuit reviewed here do not
break any new ground in the field of immigration law. They are,
however, excellent illustrations of the harshness of the immigration
laws as they are applied to the facts, and of the failure, or self-imposed
inability, of the courts to alleviate this harshness by the application
of more meaningful standards of review. The court dealt, though for
the most part implicitly, with the problems inherent in reviewing any
type of discretionary action and with those arising from the sensitive
nature of immigration. It did so in accordance with the rules es-
tablished in prior decisions by the Ninth Circuit and other courts.
Plainly, the attorney for an alien seeking relief from deportation is
83 E.g., Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955); Yamataya v. Fisher,
189 U.S. 86 (1903). See also Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216
U.S. 177 (1910): "[T]he courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so re-
strained by technical rules that they could not find some remedy, consist-
ent with the law, for acts ... that violated natural justice .... " Id. at 195.
84 Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 1968).
85 Id. at 677.
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faced with a tremendous task. These cases demonstrate the willing-
ness of the federal courts to allow the Service to apply strict stand-
ards for granting relief so long as these standards are applied con-
sistently.86 Unless the alien has outstanding equities in his favor,
his chances of success are slight.
C. A. S.
B. Summary Procedure in the Deportation of Foreign
Crewmen-Stanisic v. United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 393 F.2d 539
(9th Cir. 1968).
Immigration cases are often difficult for the court to decide be-
cause the decision is unusually important both to the alien who faces
deportation and to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
which is faced with the problem of trying to enforce the acts of Con-
gress even though they are severely undermanned. 2 In this case
Judges Browning, Duniway and Ely dealt with the problem of de-
fining the proper limits of the use of summary procedure in the at-
tempted deportation of alien crewmen. The statute on which the case
turned is section 1282(6) of Title 8 of the United States Code which
states:
[A]ny immigration officer may, in his discretion, if he determines
that an alien ... does not intend to depart on the vessel or aircraft
which brought him, revoke the conditional permit to land which was
granted such crewman under the provisions of subsection(a) (1) of
this section, take such crewman into custody, and require the master
or commanding officer of the vessel or aircraft on which the crewman
arrived to receive and detain him on board such vessel or aircraft, if
practicable, and such crewman shall be deported from the United
States .... Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the
procedure prescribed in section 1252 of this title to cases falling within
the provisions of this subsection.3
The case that raised the issue involved a Yugoslavian seaman
who came ashore under a conditional permit. A few days after land-
ing he applied to the Service for political asylum and his permit was
revoked pursuant to the statute. His lawyers began a series of legal
maneuvers that prevented his return to Yugoslavia where he claimed
he would be subject to persecution. The legal battle dragged on for
86 Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967).
1 The Immigration and Naturalization Service hereinafter is referred
to as the "Service" in the text.
2 See 95 CONG. REc. A6640 (1949).
3 8 U.S.C. § 1282(b) (1964).
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over two years before the district court approved the order of the
district director of the Service which directed Stanisic to report for
deportation. Proceedings against Stanisic had originally begun while
the ship on which he had arrived was still in port, but the last order
was issued long after the ship had sailed.4 Stanisic appealed to the
Ninth Circuit on the ground that it was error to allow the use of sum-
mary procedure after the ship had departed. Thus, the issue squarely
presented to the Ninth Circuit by the Stanisic case was whether sum-
mary deportation procedures could properly be used against an alien
crewman where deportation proceedings were begun before the crew-
man's vessel left but where the final deportation order was not ren-
dered until after the vessel had departed. The court held that the use
of summary deportation procedure was inappropriate in this situation
and remanded the case for a full, factual hearing on the deportation
issue.5
Whether or not an alien is subject to summary procedure is very
important to his future. Even if he is admittedly deportable, it is still
much to his advantage to have a full hearing provided for in section
1252 of Title 8. Under this section, he may depart voluntarily6 and,
if ordered deported, he can designate the country to which he will be
sent.7 If, however, he is deported under summary procedure, he is
turned over to the transportation line which brought him into the
country.8 In this case it would mean that Stanisic would be returned
to Yugoslavia, the country from which he was trying to flee.
Stanisic did not concede deportability. He claimed he was en-
titled to a stay of deportation under section 1253 (h) which provided
that the Attorney General was authorized to stay deportation of an
alien to a country where he would be subject to persecution. A
hearing on the issue of possible persecution, held before a delegate
of the district director, resulted in a ruling against Stanisic.
Stanisic felt that a hearing before a person who was part of the
Service staff involved a commingling of functions that was a denial
of due process. "It is shabby procedure to dispose of the question
of asylum by a hearing within a matter of hours before the man who
is at one and the same time arresting officer, judge, jury, and exe-
cutioner."9 There is general recognition that the commingling of func-
4 393 F.2d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3151 (U.S.
Oct. 22, 1968) (No. 297).
5 He also appealed on the grounds that a change in the statute relating
to persecution entitled him to a new hearing and that, in general, he had
been denied due process of law.
6 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1964).
7 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1964).
8 8 U.S.C. § 1282(b) (1964).
9 Petitioner's Opening Brief at 10, Stanisic v. INS, 393 F.2d 539 (9th Cir.
1968).
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tions is a threat to due process. In Savelis v. Vlachos, Judge Hoffman
wrote: "It is . recognized that Immigration officers are at times
inclined to be arbitrary and unreasonable, thus leading to discrim-
inatory acts in isolated instances."'1 Senator Wayne Morse also felt
strongly on this point. During debate over an amendment to the
Immigration and Nationality Act that would have completely elim-
inated the use of summary procedure, he said: "We all know that a
man who has buried himself in one side of an issue is disabled from
bringing to its decision that dispassionate judgment which Anglo-
American tradition demands .... 11 If Stanisic could avoid sum-
mary procedure, he would be entitled to a full hearing before a
special inquiry officer who would be less likely to prejudge the case.
A full hearing would also provide for procedural protections and
administrative review that are not available under summary pro-
cedure.' 2
There was an almost complete lack of material sufficiently on
point on the issue raised by Stanisic to give the Ninth Circuit any
guidance. The only cases with similar fact situations had allowed
the use of summary procedure after the ship had sailed but they did
not really deal with the issue decided here.13 None of the points on
which Stanisic relied seem to have been brought out in these cases.
Similarly, the textbooks mention the statute but make no attempt to
resolve this issue.' 4
Both sides had strong arguments for having their interpretation
of the statute adopted by the court. The Service relied heavily on
the argument that Congress desired a speedy removal of the alien
10 137 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. Va. 1955) (dictum), affd, 248 F.2d 729
(4th Cir. 1957); see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 46 (1949);
United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 200 F.2d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 1952)
(Clark, J.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 928 (1953). See gener-
ally, Boch6s, Juvenile Justice In California: A Re-evaluation, 19 HAST. L.J.
47, 62, 64-65 (1967). Boch6s attacks the practice of using the chief probation
officer as a referee and also the practice of the judge appointing the chief
probation officer, since the probation department handles most prosecutions.
11 98 CONG. REC. 5781 (1952).
12 E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b) (1964) provides a guarantee against comming-
ling of functions on the part of the judge at the hearing.
13 United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232, 237-38 (2d
Cir. 1967) (assumed without discussion that crewman was of class section
1282(b) was intended to cover); Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F. Supp. 24 (S.D. Tex.),
aff'd, 340 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1963). In this case the crewman was arrested
September 3, 1963 while his ship was still in port. The decision allowing
summary procedure to be used came down on December 31, 1963. The ship
had almost certainly left by that date.
14 E.g., F. AUERBACH, IMmIGRATiON LAWS OF THE UNTns STATES 234 (2d
ed. 1957); 1 C. GoRDoN & H. ROSENFEL, I1VnMGRATiON LAW AND PRocEDuRE,
§ 6.3(a), at 6-21 (1967).
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crewman and that this speedy removal could only be carried out if
the courts allowed them to continue to use summary procedure after
the ship or aircraft had left. There is little doubt that Congress
thought that desertion by crewmen was a serious problem.15 They
realized that the longer the alien stayed in this country, the more
complications might arise to hinder efficient deportation. 1 6 The Serv-
ice claimed that the Ninth Circuit had a clear cut decision to make.
It must either allow the continued use of summary procedure after
the ship had departed or for all practical purposes destroy the effec-
tiveness of the statute. The Service felt that with so much at stake, a
crewman would do anything in his power to avoid summary pro-
cedure, and if all he needed to do to avoid summary procedure was
to delay matters until his vessel had departed, he could delay for
that time fairly easily.
Judge Browning, writing for the court, felt that proceedings could
be conducted with sufficient speed to ensure their completion before
the vessel had departed in many cases.17 However, if a crewman
has effective legal advice, it becomes quite simple for him to delay
the proceedings for a long time. He may obtain judicial review
through habeas corpus proceedings and also on the claim of abuse of
discretion. Since a clever alien could wait until a few days before the
ship was to sail before asking for asylum, it would be very likely that
he would still be in this country after the ship had sailed. If one
considers that section 1282(b) also applies to aircraft, which usually
depart within a very short time after arrival, it becomes obvious that
the Service's lawyers had a valid argument.
Indeed, Stanisic used another maneuver that can cause serious
delays. He petitioned Congress for a private bill that would allow
him to remain in the United States.' 8 Once a bill is introduced in the
Senate, deportation is normally stayed until a final decision on the
bill is reached.'9 The House is more reluctant to interfere with de-
portation proceedings. Besides introduction of the bill, the House
requires that the author of the bill request a report from a sub-
committee. Only when the subcommittee asks the Service for the
details of the case will the stay order issue. Moreover, the subcom-
mittee makes it even more difficult to stall in this manner by asking
15 In 1947, 4,126 crewmen deserted their ships after arrival in United
States ports. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 550 (1950). In 1948, 4,353
did so. Id. at 549.
10 See, e.g., Address by Paul H. Griffith, National Commander of the
American Legion, Fifty-sixth Congress of the DAR, May 22, 1947, printed in
93 CONG. REc. 6462 (1947).
17 393 F.2d 539, 548 (9th Cir. 1968).
18 Id. at 541.
19 J. WAssEmAw, ILmviGRAnON LAW AND PRAcTicE, 112 (1961).
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the Service for these details only in cases of extreme hardship.20
Usually a considerable amount of time passes between the issuance
of the stay order and a final decision.21
In light of the abundant opportunities for delay, the Immigration
officials felt certain that Congress desired the continued use of sum-
mary procedure. To rule otherwise would be to impute to Congress
the intent to pass a very limited statute, and, in view of the magni-
tude of the problem, the Service thought it most unlikely that Con-
gress desired such a limited remedy.
Stanisic also looked to congressional intent in forming an impor-
tant part of his argument. He claimed that the statute should be inter-
preted in a manner consistent with other relevant immigration laws.
He contended it was unimaginable that Congress desired that a
harsher procedure should be applied to those who affirmatively
sought asylum than to those who avoided arrest until their ship had
left, unless there was a very good reason for doing So. 2 2 In his opinion
the only reason that could justify this discrimination was a desire to
enable ships to leave with a full crew.23 Faced with the fact that
those who manage to avoid arrest until after their ship leaves are
given a full section 1252 hearing, with all the accompanying benefits,
it would be hard to reach a conclusion other than that "the justification
for quick resolution of the problem departs with the vessel. ... 24
The courts seem to share the petitioner's low opinion of the illogical
and unfair procedures sometimes found in immigration law. Com-
menting on the denial of a hearing to an alien parolee, Judge Moore
stated: "The facts tell a story reminiscent of the 'due process' of the
Middle Ages, the Star Chamber-even of the shanghaiing of seamen. 2 5
Stanisic further argued that any ambiguity in the meaning of a statute
20 Id. at 112-13.
21 95 CONG. REc. 7369 (1949). See generally Note, Private Bills and
Immigration Law, 69 HARv. L. R v. 1083 (1956).
22 Petitioner's Reply Brief at 16, Stanisic v. INS, 393 F.2d 539 (9th Cir.
1968). It should be noted, however, that one who deliberately overstays his
permit subjects himself to the penalties recited in 8 U.S.C. § 1282(c) (1964).
These penalties are a fine of not more than $500, imprisonment for not more
than six months, or both.
23 The fact that section 1284(c) provides that during the time the ship
remains in port alternative arrangements for deporting. the alien can be
made weakens this argument. The arrangements must be made before the
ship leaves.
24 United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232, 237 (2d
Cir. 1967).
25 United States ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy, 366 F.2d 266, 271 (2d Cir.
1966) (Moore, J.) (dissenting opinion), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 388 U.S. 462 (1967); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Szlajmer v.
Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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should be resolved in favor of the alien. 26 He cited a Supreme Court
case which said: "[S]ince the stakes are considerable for the indi-
vidual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his
freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest . .. mean-
ings of the words used."27
A study of the legislative history of section 1282 (b) does very little
to resolve this conflict. Although the use of summary procedure was
debated, there was no comment directly on point. Congress knew
of the seriousness of the problem and that the Service was under-
staffed. There is no doubt that the Immigration and Nationality
Act, from which section 1282(b) originated, was not intended to be
liberal toward alien crewmen. It is unlikely, however, that the par-
ticular point at issue in the Stanisic case was ever seriously con-
sidered. "These bills, and connittee reports consuming more than
2000 pages were prepared by the Senate and House Immigration staffs,
were not read by more than 5% of those who voted for the bills, and
may not have been digested and understood by the bill's authors. "28
One item, however, does seem quite relevant to this case. That
is the rejection by the authors of the bill of a proposal that "a sum-
mary type of deportation be provided where the seaman is arrested
within 3 years after entry .... "2) The adoption of this proposal
would have made it clear that Congress felt the threat posed by
deserting seamen was adequate to warrant the withholding of pro-
cedural protections. When Congress chose instead to grant full hear-
ing to all those who avoided capture until after their ship had left, 0
it created the doubt that the Ninth Circuit was called upon to re-
solve in this case.
Although Stanisic is now before the Supreme Court on certiorari,
in view of these considerations, it seems that in ruling in favor of
Stanisic the Ninth Circuit reached the only logically possible decision.
Congress could not have intended to discriminate in favor of fugitives
and against those who applied for political asylum through proper
channels. After the ship is gone, in view of the consequences, there
can be no plausible reason for denying a crewman in jeopardy of
deportation a full hearing before a completely impartial official. If
Congress is not satisfied with this result, it can amend section 1282
(b) so that alien crewmen are not considered to "enter" but are merely
20 INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
27 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
28 Wassermann, The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952-Our
New Alien and Sedition Law, 27 TFMP. L.Q. 62, 79 n.134 (1953).
29 S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 555-56 (1950).
30 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1964). It is evident that the courts have so limited the
use of summary procedure. E.g., Matter of MK 5 I. & N. Dec. 127 (1953).
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paroled into the country. Never having "entered," the parolee would
be subject to exclusion proceedings that allow the use of summary
procedure.3 ' Then denial of the protections and advantages of a full
hearing under section 1252 would, at least, be applied consistently to
the entire class of alien crewmen. Until Congress makes such an
amendment, the narrow interpretation of section 1282(b) adopted by
the Ninth Circuit seems correct.
D. A. K.
31 E.g., United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232, 235 (2d
Cir. 1967).
